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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
In the ]\fatter of the Estate of

OLA UDIUS 1VALLI CH, Deceased,
FRED R. \V ALLICH,

Petitioner a.nd Appellant

Case No.

-vs-

10569

A. C. 1VALLiiCH, et al.,

Cross-Petitioners
and Respondents.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMEN'T OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
In this action, petitioner-appellant Fred R. Wallich
SP(~Irn a dctNmination that a prior Decree of Distribution
of the District Court made and entered in these probate
proceedings in 1959 distributed tlw residue of the dece<l<'nt's estate to him outright, or that under the Will of
tl1c' decedent herein, he was tht> bent>ficiary of an outright
gift or an estate for years with power to consume
principal, and that he has no duty to account to re-
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spondents. Respondents, vvho are ::;ome of their heirs
of th0 decedent, cross-1wtibon for an ordPr requiring
appellant to account as a testamentary trustee.

DISPOSITION IN LOvVER COURT
On trial on January 2G, 196G, the District Court of
Salt Lake County, the Honorable A. H. Ellett presiding~
sustained respondents' objections to the introduction by
appellant of evidence and appellant's written offer of
proof and, based solely upon the probate file herein,
determined that as a matter of law a D0cree of Distribution of February 24, 1959 incorporated into its terms a
portion of thP vVill of the dect•dent, that tlw -Will of tlH'
decedent was not ambiguous, and that appellant is a
testarnPntary trustPP undPr the -Will of the deeedent
and ordered appellant to account for his administration
of the trust and that the trust rPs, as deterrninPd by
the accounting, be distributed to the beneficiaries then'of. From this Order and DPcrPP of .T anuary 28, 19GG,
appellant app0a1s.
RELIEF SOUGHT

O~

APPEAL

AppPllant SPeks revrnml of the District Court's
OrdPr and DPcreci of January 28, 19GG, and remand of
t11P casp to the District Court with instructions to rnter
a <lecreP drtermining that as a matter of lmv the Decree
of Distribution of Ft-hruary 2-t, 1959, l1erPin <listrihnted
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the residue of the estate to apprllant outright and appellant has no duty to account as a trust('e, or in the
alternativP, that the District Court he instructed that
the \Vill of the decedrnt herein is ambiguous and that
it lw dirPctPd to rPe<~ive evidence to r('solve the ambiguity.
STATKl\U~:N"T

OF F ACTR

Tlw tPstator Claudius \Y allich died l\Iay 23, 1958, a
re8ident of Salt Lake County, Utah, and his Last Will
dated October 11, 1950, with coditils, was duly admitted
to probate by the District Court of Salt Lake County.
\\' alkPr Bank & Trust Company of Salt Lake City, Utah,
was appointed ExPcntor b\' Order made and enterc>d
.Jul.'' Hi, 1%8 (R 19,20).
On F<:'hruary 5, 1959, tlie gxecutor, Walker Bank,
filt>d its Pt>tition for Rett1Pment of Executor's First and
Final Account and for Distribution rPciting that the
(•state of said deeea:wd was in all r<>spects in condition
to lK• rlo8ed and the beneficiaries of the vVill of said

duePasPd

\Yen~

Pntitled to have all the remaining prop-

<·rty nm\' on hand distrilrnted to

tlH·m. Specifically, in

paragTnph 13(q), the ExPcutor petitioned that the residn(· of t!JP ('StatP h0 distrihuted " ... to Fred

R. \Vallicli,

. . . to hr· !will and use<l h.'· him in his discretion in
::1 eonlanc!' with and pursuant to the proyi:-;ions of para~·Tnpli 'i

of' tlJp

~\\'ii]

of th<> dr•('PaS<'<l." (R.

~9).
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K otiee of tlw hearing of thP P<'tition 1rns µ;1wn all
heirs (R. -t-9). Onlr n-';-;1iond<•nt A. C. \\ralli("h ol1j<•d<'d

Ii is objection was that lw elainwd to
hP the hPn<>fieiary of $10,000 urnln parag;raph 7 of th<·
\\rill, a diff Pr<>nt dispnte than the 0:10 now lwfore tlu~
to the Pr~tition.

( 'onrt.

Bef'on' ]waring on the J\,tition for Distrilm~ion, tl1<'
Ex<'tutor, \\'alker Hank & r11 rust, and n·spornlent "\. C.
\\'allid1, through e01msPI, (•nt<'l'<'ll into a Stipulation
n·citinp; . A. C. ·walliel1's c-lairn undn paragraph 7 of the
\\'ill, agn•<'inp: that all speeific l<'µ;aeie~: lw paid and tliat:
"All of the n'st, residrn· <~nd rc11w . 1<d.·1· of tl.
/JrU]Jerly now on hand for <fo,trilmtion a~' i~1 said
]H-'titio·n set forth 7H' rlistrilJ11/('(l rwd d1/i1·err·d tu
1'

Fred

ll. Tf'alli('h as set forth in said }Je!itio11,

<'xrept, that tlwre shall lit' rdairn•d out oi' :.;~1id
rest, n·sidrn' and n·111airnl<'r the sum of $1 ~J,U();;.1 :o
easli; that said $15,000.00 ('asl1 fornl :-;lw 11 ll1·
ordered l'Ptai1wcl h~· thP Ex<•en(or rnd;l f'lldlli·r
ord<>r of th<> C'OUJ't ht>rein, for 1li(• ptlrpm;l' <:[
satisf\ing thp elaim of said A. C. \YalL('lt to sn;d
$10,000.00 heqnest, in tl1<' <>vent t:iat 11<· i!.; !'lH'<'1 ,•.;:-.ful in ('Stahlislting his rip;ht th<>n·to: that i1~ th<·
<>vent lw is unsureessfnl in es1nhlislii11.": l1is rigl1'.
therPto, or anr part of said $1~>,000.00 r1•;11:iim:
aft<•r thP satisfaction of ill<• clnirn of sa:d .\. ( '.
\\Tallieh, said arnonnt aJHl ~rn:,· <l' ('1:::1~·'.; 1 1 io:;~:

tlwreon
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Note that this Rtipulation does not purport to create
a trust.
Based upon this Stipulation and there being no other
objection to the Petition, the District Court on February 24, 1959, made and entered its Order Settling
Executor'R Account, Fixing 'Compensation, and of Partial
Distribution (R. 52-G3), which provided in paragraph 6:
"All of the rest, residue and remainder of the
property now on hand for distribution, together
with all property unknown that may hereafter
discovered to have been owned by the deceased
at the time of his death or to have been acquired
by his estate subsequent thereto, be, and the same
is hereby distributed to Fred R. Wa.llich, to br
held and used by him in his discretion in accordance with and p1trsuant to the provisions of paragraph 8 of the TVill of the deceased." (Emphasis
added)
Thereafter, the Executor obtained and filed two
Receipts rxPcnted h.\T the appellant, both dated May 9,
19GO.

The first ackno,~wledges the receipt of 3,000 shares
ol' Crmn1 ZPllerbaeh Corporation common stock, "under
tl1<' provisions of the order of the above entitled court
llU1(l<' and entered on the 2-±th dav of February 1959,
to lrnve hold administer and dis1wse of the same as

'

'

'i'<·starnentary rl'rnstee and pursuant tn tlie provisions
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of Paragraph 11]ight of thr Last \Yill arnl T<•sbnll'nt o 1·
said Clau<lins \\'alli('h, DPC'l'<lsl'cl.'' (R. 19~))
Tlu• sPcond Ree Pi pt n•ci frs th(• n•ec• ipt of :3,000 skn·(·s
of Cro'\\·n Zt'll('l'ha('h Corporation C'Olll111011 stoek lJ.'< I1'n•d
R. \Vallieh as an individual \1-itlwnt n•fpn·nc'l) to mw
eapacit.'- as Trust<'<' and statPs that t!iP distrilm1<'P is,
"to hav<', hold, administer and disposp of tli<> same as
pnrsuant to tlw }H'ovisions of Paragraph Eight oi' th<·
Last -Will & T<•stamt'nt of sai(l ( 1 lnndins \\' nllieli. J)('«<•as<><l." (R. '.201)
Tlwn·after, this Court af'firnwd the Dis1 rid Court\
judg111Pnt that l'Psponclent A. C. \Y allicl1 was tint it l('d to
thP additional ht'<jll<'st of $10.000. (H. 1~0). TT'o!lir}, 1.
H'a11icli (19GO) 10 l~tah :.'.c119:!, ::l:JO P. :.:1<1 ()1-1-.
1

On .?II a_'I- JO, ] 9()(), \Valker Bank, as Ex1'i'nt;Jr, !)('( itiorn•d tlH' Disfr!d Court for final distrilmtion (H. ~(l~
:!l<i). On l\fay 10, J'.)()0, tl1e District (\nut 111a<1l· i~s Onl1·1·
Settling Final A('connt, of ~u1ipl<·11wntal (l.1Hl f'innl
Distribution and for Dis('harg-P of 1':x<'c·ntor (IL ~17-'.2'.21),
autho.ri7.ing :rncl dir<>eting- th<· l'<'sichw li<· (listril>ntP<l t<1
np1wllant, saying:

":1. That thP n·maininp; :-i_ssets of 1]1,• 1:;-;tn1<·,
ronsisting- of thP sum ol' $-'i-,000.00 <'nsli ])(• ;1:11\H'cliatPl.'- distrilmk<l and pai<l b~- tlw E\:<'('~l;,,;- /I)
F rerl R. TY all ich, !11 e n·s Id" ({ ry lw 11 ef ic iu ri; uj t711
1Yi!1 o/ llu' der,r•rr,u1 .. .. " ( l':rnpl1;'.sis '": 1, ,[ !
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Note that this Order for Final Distribution makes
no reference to the discretion vested in Fred R. vVallich
nor to the provisions of Paragraph 8 of said "'Will which
references were contained in the above quoted provisions
of the Ordtir for Partial Distribution.
On June 10, 1960, the District Court made and
entered its Final Discharge of Executor, discharging
Walker Bank and Trust Company as Executor. (R 222).
Parap;raph 8 of the decedent's Will provides:
"8. All the rest, residue and remainder of my
estate, . . . I hereby give, devise and bequeath
to my said nephew, Fred R. vV allich, son of my
deceased brother, Julius C. W allich, in trust,
nevertheless, to be held and used by him in his
sole and absolute discretion, and without restriction or control of any kind whatsoever, together
with the income therefrom, if any, as a reserve
to meet any emergencies that may arise in, and
for the use and benefit of, the \:Vallich family,
that is, my blood relations, regardless of their
degree of kindred or relationship to me; said
fund, and the income therefrom, to be held and
used by my said nephew until his death or for a
period of five ( 5) years after the date of my
death, whichever shall first occur, and upon the
occurrence of such event, my said nephew, or in
the event of his death prior to five ( 5) years
after my death, then his wife, Loretta VVallich,
who shall act as successor Trustee without bond,
shall distribntP any part of the Trnst fund that
may be then on hand, to my heirs at law then

8
living, upon the principle of rPpre:sentation. ~ly
said nephew in the administration of the trust
herein irnposPd u1wn him :shall act without the
necessity of furnishing any bond or any other
security, and without the necessity of making
any accounting of any nature what:soever to any
}Jerson or party eoneerning the administration of
his trnst."
PivP years elapsed following thP deeedt•nfs death.
HPspornlent, A. C. \Vallich, dt•manded that the amwllant
aecount, as testamentary trusteP, fo.r thP disposition ol"
tlw estate distrilmtPd to 11irn. (R.

:z:rl) .

.A]Jpe>llant then on August 20, 19ii3 fil<>d liis "J>0tition for Discharge of Testm11Pntary Trust<·P,'' (H. 22<i-

2:12), seeking dPtPrn1ination of his dutiPs, if all)' tl1<'i<'
he, in order to rPsolvt> thP demand of A. C. \ValliclL
A.11 ht•irs W<'l'<' giv(•n notieP of tl1P hearing of tlw app(•llant\ Petition.
Hespondt>nt A. '( '. \Valli eh and so111e of tl1e otlin
J1eirs-at-law fih•d tlwir Answer and Cross Petition n·quPsting that ap1wllant lH· rPquin·d to a('eount.

2Ti"2-tl). In sueh, rt>spondPnts elaim a trust \ras crt>ak<l
1>:- tlw Order of Partial Distrilmtion aml thP \\rill and
that a]Jpellant, as Tt>stamentar)' Trust('<', is n•qnire<l
to account for his administration of tl1e trust arnl to ]Ja)"
to th« lwirs-at-la\\" of said d(•eea;.;ed living- fiv(~ y<'ars
aftPr th<' <1att• of hi;.; d<•atlt all)" sm11s not dislmr;.;(•<l Ii)'
app«lhrnt (1u,·irn:.;· tl1(' trn~t p:•riod. <rnd tlta1 ;:; :;,•\];1'1t
(1~.

1

9
is estopped by the Stipulation between the Executor
and A. C. W allich and by the acceptance of the residue
under the Order fo.r Partial Distribution of February
24, 1959, from asserting that he did not take as Testamentary Trustee.
Respondents claim to represent 9/24's of the heirs
of the decedent. (R. 320).
Respondents moved for summary judgment. (R.
243-244). After hearing full argument, the District
Court, Judge Alden J. Anderson presiding, denied respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment on the ground
"That there is a genuine issue of a material fact and
that cross petitioners are, therefore, no·t entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." (R. 261).
Respondents renewed their Motion for Summary
Judgment at pretrial conference on November 10, 1965,
hut the same was again denied by the District Court,
.T udge Stewart l\f. Hanson presiding. (R. 278)
Appellant's Petition for Discharge of Testamentary
Trustee came on regularly for trial in the District Court
.T ndge A. H. Ellett presiding, on January 26, 1966.
Upon trial, appellant contended the Decree of Partial Distribution neither created a trust nor incorporated
hy rPforenee the provisions of paragraph 8 of the 'Will,
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but distributed the residue outright to appellant. In th<'
altPrnative, appellant contended that tlw \\Till itsplf
was ambiguous, and offered written and oral extrinsic
evidence concerning the facts and circumstances sm·rounding the execution of the \Vill and written declarations of the decedent to resolve the ambiguities in tlw
\Vill and to show that the testator did not intend to
create a trust but intended an outright gift to appellant
or a gift for five years with powPr to consume principal.
Respondenfa ob,jected to the introduction of any extrinsie
evidence and their objection ·was sustainPd on the ground
that the \Vill and Decrc•e of Distribution were free from
ambiguity. rr1ie Court so held even tliough two ot]H·r
judges had previously denied motions for sm1111rnr.'>"
judgment upon the Order of Partial Distribution arnl
thP \Vill.
Appellant then made his 1nitkn Offer of Proof
which is included in tlw record on aprwal and rnarl;:<'d
gxhibit 1. No further <•vidence was offered by any party.
As shown by his written Offer of Proof, con1aiiwd
in the Exhibits file in the record, appellant, if JWl'ldit h'd,
wonld have off er0d the following:
1. 0. vV. Moyle, Jr., would t0stify that lw, a rt ah

attorney, JH'E•parc•d the decedent's will and that lte krn'I\'
the dt>cPd<'nt 20 years lwfon• his death. That a

hefon• thP \Vill was sip;nPd, thP

de(·(~dent

fr\\.

<bys

had writt<'n ont
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and brought to him a typewritten sheet on decedent's
k'tterhead ·which decedent said expressed the wishes he
clrsired incorporated into the \Vill to be drmn1, a copy
of which sheet is attached to the Off er of Proof. On the
slwet the decedent said:
"The remainder of my estate, if any, to go to
my nephew Fred R. Wallich to be held by him
as a reserve for any emergencies in the W allich
family, but may he disposed of by him at any
time and in any manner that he deems best for
all concerned. without (sic) bond or restrictions
o.f any kind whatever, and without the necessity
of rendering an account of his transactions to
any one."
ln another portion of the sheet, the decedent wrote out
a specific bequest to A. C. ·vvallich "to serve as trustee
for vVilhelmina \Vallich." The decendent did not use the
·word "trust" in orally discussing the sheet and the gift
to appellant, but tlw insertion of the word was :Mr.
Moyle's own idea. On execution of the \:Vill on October
11, 1950, .Mr..l\Joyle told the decedent he had grave
doubts as to whether iiaragraph 8 of the vVill created
an enforceable trust and that it might be construed as
mt outright gift to appellant, and the decedent said in
sulrntance he did not care how it was construed. On
many occasions before J\farch 195+, the decedent said he
l1ad not sPen more than one or two of his relatives other

than appellant for thirty to forty yPars and that he was
<'iosn to appPllant than lti:-; otlH•r relativPs.
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2. Yictor R. Hansen would tt>stify that hl' is a
practicing California lawyPr, that he was for six years
a Judge of the Superior Court for the County of Los
Angeles, that he was an Assistant Attorney General in
charge of the Anti-rl1 rust Division of tht> F. S. Dqmrtnwnt of Justice and had known the decedent and had
seen him two or three tirnPs per year from thP <>nd or
1950. TlH' decedent said that ap1wllant was like a son
to him; that he had always hePn thongl1tful of him: that
decedent's estah' was largely dm• to a gift from appellant's father; that his J10usPkeeper and aprwllant had
heen the clo·sest to him, and that ap1wllant was reall~
his heir; that there wasn't anyom• PlsP tliat had he<•n
<'lose to him at all dnring the latPr years of his life;
that on the occasion of appellant's daughter's Wf'dding,
decedent put his arm arournl appellant and said "Fn·d
is going to be my h(~ir; this is reall~· my son"; and that
similar expressions werP us<>d on a numlwr of other
ocraswns.
:1. Ap]wllant, tlw d('('PdPnfs iwphP\\·, would t<•sti f~·
m the same manm•r as .Judg(• Hansen. Additionall>·, Jw
\rould testify that he saw the dt>r<><l('nt and hi~; wi I'<·
frequently from ] 920 on; that they <'Xprf'SSt'd affection
for him. After the der<•dent's wifo di Pd in 19-1-9, decedent
and appellant visited six or SPY<'n tinws a y<•ar in Los
Angeles or Salt Lak<> Cit>·· Forty-onp lett<>rs written
hy dec<•dent to app<'llant and his \Yifo lwtm'<'n 1'.)-U and
195~ ar<> attaclwd to th<> Offn of Proof. Appellant arnl
df•('(•d<'nt fr(•qw·ntly took trip:-; tog·ptlwr. D!'C<'(;( i:t said

l:i
he never saw any of his other relatives, except on one
occasion. Decedent said he felt alienated from the rest
of his family because his father had disinherited him,
but appellant's father (the decedent's brother) gave
decedent the share decedent would otherwise have received under their father's will, that such provided the
foundation for decedent's estate and that appellant's
father having died, the only way decendent could express
his gratitude would be in the Will he would draw.
Reference is made to the Off er of Proof for further
<ldails of the foregoing.
After rejecting the Offer of Proof, the District
Court then made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law ( R. 309-310), and in Finding No. 2 found that
the Court by its Order of Partial Distribution dated
February 24, 1959, distributed the residue of decedent's
estate to the appellant Fred R. Wallich:
'' ... to be held and used by him together with
the income therefrom during the period of five
vears after the date of the death of the testator,
in his sole and absolute discretion and ·without
restriction or control of any kind whatsoever, to
meet any emergencies that may arise in and for
the use and benefit of the \Vallich family, and
at the end of said five-year period, said Fred R.
\Vallich, or his 8Uccesor Trustre should he be
deceased, should distribute any of the trust fund
that might then be on hand to their lwirs-at-law
of Clan<lins \Vallieh then living."
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As Conclusions of Law, the Court recited that appellant, as said testamentary trustee, should be required
to fully account and upon said accounting should be
ordered to distribute to said heirs-at-law all of the trust
funds on hand at the expiration of said five-year period
as shown by the accounting approved by the Court.
Based upon said Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, the ,Court made its Order and Decree dated
,January 28, 1966 (R. 312-313) ordering appellant, as
testamentary trustee, ·within thirty days, to fully account and that upon approval of the accounting the
appellant, as testamentary trustee, be ordered to deliver
the trust fund, if any there be, to said heirs-at-law.
This appeal is prosecuted from said Order and
Derree.
SFMlVfARY OF APPELLAN'P'S CONTEN11 IONR
AS TO GROUNDS FOR REVERSAL
The ap1wllant presents the follo·wing summary of
grounds for reversal of said Order and Decree, each of
·which will be thereafter argued and presented in detail:
POINT I
THE DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION CANNOT BE
IMPEACHED BY THE WILL.
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A decree of distribution under a will supersedes the
will and becomes the final and conclusive adjudication
of the testamentary disposition made by the decedent
and the validity, interpretation and effect of each provision in the will and this is true even though the decree
is erroneous or inaccurate in respect to specific provisions in the will and the will cannot be used to impeach
the decree of distribution.
POINT II
UNDER THE DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION APPELLANT IS NOT A TRUSTEE.

The Decree of Distribution of February 24, 1959,
constitutes an outright bequest of the residue of appellant, is free from ambiguity and does not create a trust.
Said decree does not incorporate paragraph 8 of the
\Vill by reference.
POINT III
UNDER THE DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION, APPELLANT IS NOT REQUIRED TO ACCOUNT AND
CANNOT NOW BE REQUIRED TO ACCOUNT.

Assuming that the Order of Partial Distribution of
Fehruarv 24 1959 incor1iorates the provisions of para. '
'
graph 8 of the \Vill, it incorporates all of the provisions
and, as incorporated, each and every provision by that
adjudication is final and conclusive even though it may
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erroneous. This includes the prov1srnn m the .\Yill
that no accounting may he required of appellant, as
trustee. The Court may not now enforce some of the
provisions of paragraph S of the \Vill and disregard
other provisions. Therefore, the provi1'ion of paragraph 8 of the \Vill to the effect that aPlwllant slia11
not be required to account ·was adjudicated in the Order
of Distrihution and "-as conclusive even though it may
ht· PlTOneous. The District Court erred in ordering
appellant to account, in contravrntion of the Orc1<•r of
Distribution.
b<~

POINT lV
APPELLANT IS NOT A TRUSTEE UNDER THE
WILL.

Assuming that paragraph 8 of tlw ·will \nts ineorporatt•d in the Decree of Distribution, ('Ven without the
aid of extrinsic evidence, paragraph S of the \Vill <l<ws
not ereatP a trust but is an outright gift of the rPsidue
or an estate for years in appellant.
POINT V
THE WILL IS AMBIGUOUS AND THE COURT
ERRED IN EXCLUDING PA ROLE EVIDENCE IN
INTERPRETING IT.

Assuming that the Decree of Distribution of F('lirnary :z+, 19rl9 d<ws inrorporate thP provisions of para-
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graph 8 of the Will, the result is to create many ambiguities concerning the intent of the testator as to what he
meant by paragraph 8 and some of the provisions of
paragraph 8 are in conflict with other of its provisions.
Under these circumstances it was error for the District
Court to sustain respondents' objection to the introduction of extrinsic evidence offered for the purpose of
interpreting paragraph 8 and resolving the ambiguities
and conflicts so that the intent of the testator would be
ascertained, declared and enforced.
POINT VI
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO REQUIRE APPELLANT TO ACCOUNT.

It was error to order appellant to account in violation of the provisions of paragraph 8 of the Will, at
least in the absence of proof on the part of respondents
that the alleged trustee was guilty of fraud.
POINT VII
APPELLANT IS NOT ESTOPPED TO ASSERT
HE IS NOT A TRUSTEE.

Neither of the receipts signed by appellant are relevant because they were executed after the entry of the
Decree of Distribution and cannot impeach or modify a
judgment which has become final. There is no evidence
that the respondents <'hanged their position in reliance
tl1<'l'POn to their detriment.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION CANNOT BE
IMPEACHED BY THE WILL.

The law applicable is clearly set forth in 34 C. J. S.
conunencing at page 456 (Executors and Administrators,
paragraph 529) as follows:
"A decree of distribution under a \Yill is a
final and conclusive adjudication of the testamentary disposition made by decedent of his
property, the validity, meaning, interpn~tation,
and effect of the will and particular provisions
thereof, the property covered by the will, the
rights of legatees and devisees, see supra this
section and subdivision, and incidental questions
necessarily involved in the determination of the
foregoing matters; and this is true even though
the decree may be erroneous m inaccurate in
respect of specific provisions of the will, as the
will is only evidence on which tlw court pass<·s
in rendering the decree, it is merged in the decn'<',
and rannot he used to impearh it, ... ''
The authorities cited in support of this proposition
are numerous and fully support the text. It is only
nc-icessarv to refer to. a few of the supporting- authorities.
In C'ook v. Cook, 111 P. :Zd iU:2 (Cal.,
prnvided as follows:

rn-n)

tli<> \\'ill
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"I am leaving 40% of what I possess to my
son Nelson, knowing that he will pay his sister
the $40.00 a month referred to, or more, if he is
able."
. The Decree of Distribution distributed 40% of the
estate to Nelson without including any provision requiring him to pay any sum to his sister. The sister then
brought action claiming the son took the property as
trustee under the provision in the Will for the payment
of the $40.00 a month.
The Court held that the failure to include in the
Decree of Distribution any language declaring that the
property was distributed in trust was a conclusive and
final adjudication, that there was no trust for the sister
and, rightly or wrongly, the sister was barred from
going behind the Decree of Distribution. Held:
"If there is a will the court must pass upon
the validity of the disposition attempted by the
testator, and the decree of distribution is conclusive thereof.
"The decree is necessarily a judicial construction of the will and fixes the several interests
of the distributees by designating the persons
and the proportions or parts to which each is
entitled and is conclusive thereof. Legacies not
mentio~ed in the decree are cut off. A claim of
interest upon a legacy should be asserted in the
proceeding for distribution, and a distribution
without interest is a determination that the
legatee is entitled to none.
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"The will is merely a part of the evidence
upon which the decree is based, and becomes
merged in and superseded by the decree, tbe
decree becoming the measure of the rights of the
beneficiaries and the law of the estate. The decree therefore is conclusive as against collateral
attack, even though in contravention of the terms
of the will. In other words, the will cannot be
used to impeach the decree."
The same principle was applied to the opposite
factual situation in Shattuck v. Shattuck, 192 P.2d 229
(Ariz. 1948). There, the Will specifically provided for
the residue to be distrihut<>d in trust to a named trustee
for the testator's children.
At the conclusion of administration, the t>state vvas
distributed pursuant to the "'\Yill by the Decree of Distribution which r<"rited as foHows:
"To Spencer S. Shattuck as trust("e of the
Lemuel C. Shattuck trust;
"All the rest and residue of said property
and estate to be held in trust as providl'<l under
the last "Will and Testament of Lemuel C. Shattuck as above described ... be, and the same is
hereby distributed to Spencer S. Shattuck as
Trustee, above mentioned, and to be handled hy
him in accordance with the trust provisions of
the Last \Vill and Testament of LP1m1el C. Shattuck."
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One of the heirs claimed that the trust created by the
\Vill ~was invalid and that tlw residue should pass according to the laws of intestate succession. The Court held
that the Decree of Distribution was final and conclusive
<>ven if enoneous and that the validity of the trust
created by the Decree \Yas rPs adjudicata. Held:
"The will has been probated, the estate distributed, and the proceedings in probate ended
by a final decree. . . . A decree of distribution
supersedes the will and prevails over the provisions thereof and the will becomes merged
in the decree, which itself becomes the measure
of the rights of the beneficiaries and the law of
the estate (Citing many authorities).
* * * * *
"It is generally held also that a will may not
Le used to impeach a decree of final distribution,
hut may he used only in aid of it. (Citing authorities)
"The power and jurisdiction conferred upon
the Superior Court sitting in probate includes the
power of the probate court to construe the will
of the decedent, the ascertainment of the persons
,vho succeed to the property of the estate, and
the validity and effect to be given the language
of the will, and this in the exerci:w of its original
and exclusive jurisdiction.
* * * * *
"All probate proce>edings and judg1m~nts
rendered therein are in the nature of proceedings
in rem, and a final decree of distribution has th<~
force and effect of a judgment in r<'m.
* * * * *

2'2

"A decree of final distribution is a judicial
construction of a will, conclusive upon all heirs,
devisees and legatees, and immune from collateral
attack unless it is void on its facf'.
* * * * *
"The will attempted to create a trust which,
considered by itself, u·as no dmtbt invalid under
the rule declared in the Estate of Fair, 132 Cal.
the decree, which itself becomes the mt>aslUP
523, 60 P. 442, 64 P. 1000, 84 Am.St.Rep. 70. The

validity of the trust is, hou·ever, no longer open to
qustion. The decree of the superior court distriu11ting the residuP of the estate to trustees upon
certain trusts is a. conclusive adjudication of thP

validity of the disposition made by tlw testator.
(citing cases). And it is equally conclusivt> as an
ascertainment and adjudication of the tenus of the
trust, and of the rights of all parties claiming any
legal or equitable interest under the will. (citing
cases). The decree s1.1persedes the will and vre-

vails 'over any provision therein which may ue
thought inconsistent with the decree.' (citing
casPs). In determining tlw rights of thP wid<rw, we
are, therefore, to look, not to the terms of the 11'ill,
but to those of the decree of distribution.'' ( l<~m

phasis added)

Jn Re TVaU.a-ce's Estate. 219 P.2d 910 (Cal. J0f'>O)

held:
"It is settled by a long line of authorities
that under the doctrine of rt>s adju<licata a will
cannot be looked to for the purpose of impeaching
or contradicting the plain and unambiguous llrovision in a Decree of Distribution mH.'P tl1P Dt>cn·P
has hecomf' final."
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In Miller v. Walker Bank & Trust Conipany, 17 Ut.
2d 88; 404 P.2d 675, this Court recently held:
"The probate of the estate was a proceeding
in rem and the decree after the time for appeal
expired became final and conclusive and it no.t
subject to attack, except for fraud."
See also Bindley v. Mitchell, (Kan. 1951) 228 P.2d
689 and In re Lo rings Estate (Cal. 1946) 175 P.2d 524.
In the latter, the Court said at page 529:

"It is settled, however, that, once final, an

erroneous decree of distribution, like any other
erroneous judgment, is as conclusive as a decree
that contains no error."

It is therefore established that the Decree of Distribution is a final judgment, conclusive on all matters
contained therein even though erroneous which cannot
he~ impeached or modified by reference to the -Will.
For the same reason the Decree of Distribution cannot be impeached or modified by reference to the two
"Re>ceipts of Distrilmtee" (R. 199-201) signed by the
appellant after the entry of the Decree.
POINT II
UNDER THE DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION APPELLANT IS NOT A TRUSTEE.
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The Order of Partial Distribution of February 2-1-,
1966, was made and entered after petition by the Executor, "'\Valker Bank & Trust Company, after notice to all
heirs, and after \Vritten Stipulation thereto between the
Executor and respondent A. C. vVallirh. rrhe Petition
of Walker Bank, Exe>cutor, the Stipulation of A. C.
\Vallich, and the Order of Distribution itself a1l entirely
omitted any refen'nce to a "trust." lnstPad, tlw Order
of Partial Distribution distributed the residue of the
estate to appellant ((to be held nnd 11scd uy hi1n in his
discretion in accordance with and pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 8 of tlw \Vill :" (R. 62).
The Decree did not designate the distribution as
one in trust nor the appellant as a trustee, nor did it
name any beneficiaries in whom is vested tlw right to
Pnforce tlw trust, nor did it mention a trust pm·po~w.
nor a time period. rrh(~ residue was distrilmted to app<'llant to he held and used hy him in his discr<-'tion.
Paragraph 6 of the Order of Partial Distribution
is entirely free from ambiguitiPs. lt is only when refrrPnre is made to paragraph 8 of tlw -Will that aml>iguit.Y
ran be imporkd into the Ordt•r of Distrilmtion arnl it
has been established in Point I that the terms of tlH·
Decree of Distribution rannot he impeaehed lw refrrPnrt•

tn tlw vVill.
The Stipulation upon ·whieh r<>spondPnt A. C. \\' a1lirl1 's ohjertions to tlJ<• Petition for Partial Tfo·il'ilmtion
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were resolved, subparagraph (l)(e), (R. 50), unequivocally provides for the distribution of the residue to
appellant without any reference to the language in paragraph 8 of the Will and shows that the parties did not
intend that a trust would be created. No other heirs
objected to the Petition for Partial Distribution, though
all had notlce (R. 48), and none now claim lack of notice.
The Order of Partial Distribution is in substantial
accord with the Stipulation but with the addition of the
words, "in accordance with and pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 8 o.f the Will." The Stipulation
describes appellant merely as the residuary beneficiary.
Neither the Court nor the parties intended the language, "in accordance with and pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 8 of the Will" as incorporating the
forms of paragraph S of the vVill into the Order of
Partial Distribution as words of limitation.
The Stipulation of the parties upon which the Order
of Partial Distribution was based clearly does not contemplate any limitation in the bequest of the residue.
Paragraph 15 (R. 57-Gl) of the Order of Partial
Distribution dated February 24, 1959 distributes fifteen
separate specific bequests to various beneficiaries and in
t·aeh subparagraph the Court recites that the bequest

is distrihutt'<l, "undt'r tlw provisions of paragraph 4
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of the Will of the deceased." rrhis language was not
used by the Court fo.r the purpose of limiting the rights
of the fifteen distribute(-'S or for the purpose of incorporating into the Order of Distribution the language of
paragraph 4 of the Will. The use of similar language
in paragraph 15(q) (R. Gl) of the Order distributing
the residue to appellant, cannot be construed to have
any different meaning as to appellant than the reference
to paragraphs in the 'Nill in distributing the fifteen
specific bequests.
If there is any doubt concernmg the intention of
the Court in the Order of Partial Distribution of February 24, 1959, that doubt can be resolved by ref Prence to
the Final Decree of Distribution of :May 10, 19GO, paragraph 3, (R. 220) wherein the Court upon Pt>tition by
the Executor, Walker Bank, orderPd, "that the remaining
assets of the estate ... he immediately distributed and
paid by the executor to Fred R. \Vallich, the rrsiduar_\·
beneficiary of the vVill of the de<'<'.ased."

This Final Decree of Distribution unequivocall~·
designates the appellant as the residuary lwnefician·
without limitation. It is aJlparent that tlw Court in
this Final Decree did not regard paragraph 8 of tlw
\Vill to have been incorporatod by rt>fen'llC(' into tliP
Partial DPcree of Distribution dated Fehrnar.'· '..?-!, 1959.
11 he words in the Partial Decree of Distribution "in
accordance with and pnrsnant to paragraph 8 of the
Will" an' d(•scriptive only ancl not lirnitatimn;.

This Court has previously held in another case that
as a matter of law the words in a Decree of Distribution
following that portion of the Order distributing the
residue without limitation and adding, "in accordance
with the Last Will of the deceased" are descriptive only
and do not impose limitations or conditions upon the
unconditional language disposing of the residue.
In Miller v. Walker Bank & Trust Compa;ny, 17
Utah 2d 88, 404 P.2d 675 (1966), the Will bequeathed
the residue to the appellant, "and I do this acknowledging all my children hereinafter named and for the reason
that I know that my beloved wife will care for my
children from the remainder of my estate, if there be
any, share alike."
In the probate proceedings the Decree of Distribution distributed the residue to the wife with the addition
of the phrase that the residue was distributed, "in
accordance with the last Will and testament of the
dPceased."
The wife later died and left the residue of the estate
shP had received by said DPcrPe to one of her children
to the exclusion of the others. The disinherited children
claimed that the phrase, "in accordance with the Will"
had the t'ffect of incorpo·rating the terms of the Will
which in turn imposed a trust upon thf' property for
thP benefit of all the children.
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The District Court ruled m accordance with this
contention and distributed the property one-fourth to
ea.ch of the children.
This Court unanimously reversed and held that the
words "in accordance with the terms of the Will" did
not impose any conditions or restrictions on the Decn'l'
of Distribution. Held:
"We are constrained to disagree with the
position espoused by the plaintiffs. The decree
is clear enough in its terms. It unequivocally
distributes the property in question to Nettie
Knudsen Miller, and there is nothing uncertain
or ambiguous in its doing so. The fact that it
adds the recital, 'that [the decree] is in accordance with the last will and testament of the
deceased' amounts only to a declaration of tlw
basis for making the distribution, but it does not
impose any condition or restriction upon the
effect of the distribution. The probate~ of the
estate was a proceeding in rem and the decn·P
after the time for appeal expirrd heca1rn~ final
and conclusive and is not subject to attaek, Pxcept
for frand.
"Further persuading us to the conclm;ion ~we
have reached is the fact that it is extremely doubtful that the language of the \\·ill would justify a
conclusion that a trust was intended. Rat]1er tlw
language seems to indiratP clearly an int<>nti011
hy the testator to leave to his ~wife all of his
1)foperty to he used in acrordaneP with lH'r judg·rn0nt."
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It is submitted that the Miller case is controlling
in the case at bar.
The Decree of Distribution in Miller orders distribution of the estate to the wife "in accordance with the
last ~will and testament of the deceased."
The Decree of Distribution in the case at bar orders
the residue of the estate distributed to appellant, "to be
held and used by him in his discretion .... " So far this
is an outright and unlimited gift. Then follow the words,
" ... in accordance with and pursuant to the provisions
of paragraph 8 of the Will.''
1

There is no significant difference in the language
used in the two cases. The addition of "pursuant to"
to "in accordance with" in the case at bar does not in
any way change the meaning of the language as being
idPntical with the Miller case.
rrhe parallel to the M1'llcr case
nvoided.

lS

too clear to be

McGavin v. San Francisco P.0.A. Society, (Cal.
1917) 1G7 P. 182, held that a decrf'e of distribution
would not be set aside, even though property was dist ri huted to thf' wrong beneficiary through mistake of
law made by the executor's attorney, sincf' thf' mistake
\\'as not extrinsir. The Court said:
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" . . . a decree of distribution is a judgment in
rem, and, although erroneous, is as conclusive
against one who fails to appear, having the opportunity so to do, as it is against a party whose
fault produced the error."
"Fraud or mistake is extrinsic when it deprives the unsuccessful party of an opportunity to
present his case to the court. TV estphal v. Westphal, Cal. 126 P.2d 105, 107; Cardozo v. Bank of
America, (Cal. 1953) 254 P.2d 949."

'80 here, respondent A. C. W allich expressly stipulated to the decree and all other respondents here had
notice of hearing and opportunity to object before the
decree was entered, but did not do so.
Therefore, it is concluded that the language in the
Order of Partial Distribution dated February 24, 1959,
"in accordance with and pursuant to paragraph S of the
last will of said deceased," amounts only to a declaration
of the basis for making the distribution but does not
impose any conditions or restrictions upon the effect o t•
the distribution.
If the Order of Partial Distribution dated February
24, 1959 is construed as creating a trust as to that part
of the estate then distributed, it is clear that the Decree
of Final Distribution dated :May 10, 1960, is an unlimited
:rnd unconditional distribution of the then residue of
the estate and we will be faced with the anamolous situation of having the appellant receive under the sarnP
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clause of the Will a portion of the estate in trust and
other portions of the estate frpe of the trust.
It is, therefore, concluded that neither Decree purported to create a trust but each vested the entire beneficial interest in the distributee so that said Decrees are
final and conclusive and cannot be impeached by referPnce to the Will.

Finding No. 2 (R. 309) is the ultimate finding upon
which the District Court's Order & Decree of January
28, 1966 is based. This Finding clearly violates the
foregoing rules of law by using the Will to impeach
the Decree of Partial Distribution.
This finding reads as follows:
"2. On February 2-1:, 1959 this court did make
and enter its order distributing to Fred R. Wallich as testamentary trustee the rest, residue and
remainder of the estate to be held and used by
him together with the income therefrom during
the period of five years after the date o.f the
death of the testator, in his sole and absolute
discretion and without restriction or control of
any kind whatsoever, to meet any emergencies
that may arise in and for the use and benefit of
the vVallich family, and at the end of said five
year period, said Frc•d R. \Vallich or his succ~s
sor trustee should he be deceased, should distribute any of the trust fund that might then be
on hand to the heirs at law of Claudius \Vallich
then living upon thr principal of represPntation."
(R. 309-:ilO)
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Hence, jt is dear that Finding No. 2, upon which
the Order & Decree appealed from is bas('d, is in error.
To be correct, the Finding should reach the opposite
result, that is, that the Order of Partial Distrjbution
of February 24, 1959, distributed the residue outright
to appellant. The District Court's Order of January 28,
1966 should be reversed and the case remanded to the
District Court with instructions to enter a Decree determining that the Order of Partial Djstrihution distributed
thr rrsidue outright to appellant.
POINT III
UNDER THE DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION, APPELLANT IS NOT REQUIRED TO ACCOUNT AND
CANNOT NOW BE REQUIRED TO ACCOUNT.

Finding No. 2 above quoted adopts some of tlw
provisions from paragraph S of the vVill and adds them
to the original Order o.f Partial Distribution of _F'ehruary 24, 1959, but rejects other important portions of
paragraph S of the "Will. If it be determined that the
Order of Distribution did incorporate paragraph 8 of
the vVill, it must incorporate all of its teTrns - not
merely some of them.
The significant portion of paragraph S of the \Vill
which was omitted from the Order of January :.28, 196()
appealed from is the last sentence reading- as follow~~,
"~f y said neplww in the administration of t11e trn~t
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herein imposed upon him shall act without the necessity
of furnishing any bond or any other security and with01lt the necessity of making any accounting of any natitre
whatsoever to any person or zJarty concrrnin.r; the adm1:11istration of this triist."
If paragraph 8 of the \Vill was incorporated in the
Order of Distribution by reference, it follows that it
also incorporated the provision that no accounting whatsoever be required. As thus incorporated, the Order
of Distribution has become the final and conclusive
monument as to the rights and duties of the parties and
c·annot now he modified, even though Prroneous.

It follows that Finding No. 2 is not supported by
the evidence. The evidence is paragraph 8 of the Will
and Finding· No. 2 adopts only a portion of it.

It, therefore, follows that the Order appealed from,
in::mfar as it requires an accounting by tlw appellant,
is contrary to the final and conclusive Order of Partial
Distribution dated Ft>hruary 24, 1959, and the Order
must he rPversed.
POINT IV
APPELLANT IS NOT A TRUSTEE UNDER THE
WILL.

Assuming- that paragraph 8 of the ·will was incorporated in the OrdPr of Partial Distrihntion, tlwn evPn
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without the aid o.f extrinsic evidence, paragraph 8 of
n
the Will does not create a trust but is an outright gift
to appellant or an estate for years in appellant.
The following quotations from Restatement
Trusts, Second, are applicable:

of

125, If property is tranferred to a person to
disposed of by him in any manner or to any
person he may select, no trust is created and
the transferee takes the property for his o-wn
benefit.
"~
h~~

"(a) The general rule. vVhether the tram1feror
has manifested an intention to give the property
to a person in trust or to give it to him for his
own benefit is a question of interpretation of the
transferor's languagp in the light of all th<• rll'cumstances.
"No trust is created if the transferor does not
manifest an intention to impose enforcPable duties
upon the transferee. . . . (No trust is creatPd)
if settlor manifests an intention to impos<~ merely
a moral obligation, and to leave the transfen·P
free from any legal obligation to apply the prop(•rty to the purpose. His intention not to imposP
enforceable duties may appear from the fact that
the purposes to which the property is to Le applied are so broad as to. shmv that the transferor
intended that the transferee should be Pntitled
to use the pro1wrty for his own benPfit.
"(b) If the tranferor manifests an intention to
give the property to a person for his own lwnPfit,
no trust arises and the transferee may (1o as 11<~
likes with the property.
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"Illustration 2. A bequeaths $100 000 to B to be
.
' such manner
'
disposed
of to such persons and in
and in such sum or sums of money as he in his
discretion shall think proper. B takes the money
for his own benefit."
"§ 187 (k) Discretion of Trustee,

"It is true the powers conferred upon a tr(ltn,S-

f eree may be so extensive as to indica.te an
intention not to create a trust but to give
the beneficial interest in the property to the
transferee."
"§ 172( d) Duty to Account,

" ... The language of the trust instrument,
however, may manifest am intent that the
property should be held free of trust, in
which case the (tr an sferee) is the beneficial
owner and incurs no liability no matter what
use or disposition he makes of the property."
Hence, the basis for decision becomes : Does this
vVill show intent to impose enforcea7Jle d1tties on the
donee? The \.Vill here manifests lack of imposition of
Pnfo.rceahlP duties in the following respects:
1.

Discretion. The \Vill says "sole and absolute"

discrrtion and "without rPstrietion or control of any
kind whatsoever."

Such hroad discretion negates an

Pnforc<'ahle duty 1wr Restatement of Trusts, §187 (k).
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2. Purpose. The purpose of the alleged trust is
very, very vague and broad. By ~125, Restatement of
Trusts, such broad purpose negates manifestation of
enforceable duties. Th("' words, "emPrgency," "reserve''
and "family" are vague and hroad in themselves. N ok
also the trust purpose is not limited to emergencies.
The vVill says " ... emergencies that may arise in, mu!
for the use and benefit of, the \Vallich family, . . . "
The words "and for the use and benefit of" have no
meaning whatever if the trust purpose is construrd to
he limited to emergencies. By 74-2-9, U.C.A. 1953, every
("'Xpression in the will is to he given some effect, if
possible. Therefore, the purprnse of this allPged trust
is also "for the use and benefit of the \Vallich family,''
whirh is so broad as to Pntirely negate intent to cn•att>
an enf01·reable duty.
:3.

Accounting. ThP \Vill wmves accountings and

honds. By

~172

( d), RestatPment of Trusts, such negatPs

pnforceahle duty.
4.

Beneficiaries. "Family, that is, my blood rda-

tions, regardless of their degree of kindn•d or relationship to me," "HPirs-at-LmY." The \Yill is ver)T vagne
as to defining beneficiaries. \Vhy leave a ·will at all if
the bulk of the estate goes to one's heirs~ "Of t\rn modz•s
of interpreting a will, that is to be pn•fened y, 11 ieli
·will prevrnt a total intestacy," 7-1:-:2-10, r.C.,\. l!l:J:L
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5.

Inconsistency. This Will provides :
" ... To Fred R. Wallich, In ·Trust, nevertheless,
(1) to be held and used by him in his sole and
absolute discretion and without restriction or
control of any kind whatsoever ... as a reserve
... for the use and benefit of ... family . . . ,
(2) said fund . . . to be held and used by
said nephew . . . for 5 years . . . and . . .
said nephew ... shall distribute any part of
Trust fund that may then be on hand ... to
heirs ... " (numerals added).

my
my
the
my

rrhe second and entirely independent clause after the

seniicolon creates no trust purpose and expressly says
the fund may be "held and used by my nephew" and not
for anyone else's benefit during 5 years.

6.

Disinheritance. Paragraphs G and 9 of the "'Will

specifically disinherit heirs not specifically named. The
testator can hardly have intended by paragraph 8 to
create an enforceable duty under paragraph 8 to distribute the remainder of the alleged trust to "heirs-at-law"
whom he has disinherited.

7.

"Any Part." The clause, "shall distribute any

part of tlie 'rnrnt fund that may he then on hand" in
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the Will recognizes expressly there may be no funds
at all at the end of five years.
8. Term. The Will says : " ... to be held and used
by my said nephew until his death or for a period of
five ( 5) years after the date of my death, whichever
shall first occur." Only appellant can "hold and use"
the fund. The testator would not have limited the term
to the appellant's life unless he intended the appellant
to use the funds himself for five years, which negates
a trust. Restatement of Tntsts, Second, §125(b).
The following authorities are applicable:
Collins v. JJ1osher, 91 F.2d 582 (C.iC.A. 9th, 1937).
The \Vill gave property to the son and daughter, in
trust, to be managed and controlled, as they deemed hest
for the beneficiaries, without the jntervention of any
court and without other authority than their own and
after the payment o.f specific bequests that the residue
be distributed to the son and daughter. It provided that
if a vacancy occurred in the trusteeship the Court should
appoint successors and waived bond.
The Decree of Distribution in the probate court
awarded the property to the son and daughter, "as the
will directed to be done." The son and daughter divided
the property between themselves. After the death of
the son, the assignee of one of his children commenced
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action against the surviving daughter. The daughter
testified that her mother named them as trustees for
convenience so that they could convey title without the
signature of their spouses. "My mother's main idea as
she expressed to me was that when we were gone - that
she wanted the land to go and descend to her blood heirs
... these being the trust beneficiaries of her will."
Plaintiff claimed a trust was created for the benefit of testator's heirs at law.

Held: No tntst.
"A 'trust' is 'a fiduciary relationship with respect
to property, subjecting the person by whom the
property is held to equitable duties to deal with
the property for the benefit of another person,
which arises as a result of a manifestation of an
intention to create it.' Restatement of the Law
of Trusts, Section 2. So far as shown there is
no equitable duty resting on respondent to hold
or deal with the property in question for the benefit of another person." (emphasis added).
In Axtell v. Coous, 89 So. 419 (Fla.) the will providtid:
''I do give, devise and bequeath unto my hm;band
.James N. Coons, as trustee for my granddaughter
Patricia Crossman and Josephine Crossman, lwr
mother, sharp and sharp alikP, all of my propert:v
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. I do give him full power to manage, control,
sell, mortgage, encumber or lease jn any way ht~
may desire ... I do direct that he be not required
to render or make any accounting to any court
... I do direct that my daughter-in-law, Josephine
Crossman, do succeed to the said James N. Coons,
as trustee ... not required to give any bond or
make any accounting."

It was held that the broad powers of management
and disposition coupled with the requirement that the
trustee be not obliged to account negated intent to creatE>
an enforceable trust and in spite of the use of the word
"trustee" in the Will Co-0ns took the bequest free of any
trust obligations. The Court said:
"Except for the itse of the word 'trustee,' ire fail
to discover anything in the will to indicate the
piirpose of creating a trust for the benefit of any
cestui que tru,st. It is contrary to the conCl:'ption
<lind purpose of a trust that the person designated
as trustee be given absolute and imrestrninNl
control over the property with the right to sell
and use the proceeds of the sale a,s he may see
fit without liability or accountalJility to a cestui
que trust. The purpose of a trust is to provjde
some one to hold and manage the trust pro1wrty
or funds derjved therefrom for the benefit of
some person or persons to whom he shall b<•
accountable, not only for the specific trust property, but for the proceeds of its sale, its accretions, its earnings, and any and all funds coming
into his hands from, by, or through the propert_\'
of which he is the trustee. (Coons) \\'HS qice11
possession, control, tlu,, be1u'ficial 11se and o!Jsol11fr
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and 'Uncontrolled .doniinion over the property.
Sitch power def eats the creation of a tntst for the
benefit of any one else ,a.nd the mere designating
of Coons as trustee is not sufficient to die,stroy
the palpable pitrpose of the will to place the
property in the control in Coons for his personal
use and benefit, with the e.xpress provision empowering him to dispose of the property without
coitrt authority, and without accoimtabdity to the
sitpposed cestitis que trust.

"One of the essential elements of a trust is that
the trustee shall hold the property for a 'specified
or ascertainable ohjeet.' Another rule governing
trusts is that 'The disposition of the property must also
be definitely stated; there can be no valid trust
unless it is capable of being enforeed even against
the wish of the trustee; a mere honorary obligation which the trustee may perform or not at his
will does not create a trust. . . . '" (Emphasis
added)
In Pon::dino v. Pon ::elino, 26 N.vV.2d 330 (Iowa)
tlw trust granted the trustee broad powers, similar to
tltP ahoYe. The Court held the entire beneficial interest
in the trust \Yas vested in the trustPP free of any trust
obligations, saying:

"A trust 'lS not created imless the scttlor manifests an intention to inipose Hpon the transferee
·duties irhich are enforcealJle in the courts. Restrdemc11t, Trusts, RPction 25, Section 125, eomm0nt a; ... Ind0ed a trust is definPd as a fiduciary relationship with respect to property, suh-
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jecting the person by whom the property is held
to equitable duties to deal with it for the benefit
of another ....

"A corolla.ry to the rule that a trust involves
the imposition of enforceable duties ·upon the
transferee is that there is nu property which can
be the subject of a tnist where its application
to the purposes of the trust depends upon the
a·bosolute and unconditional discretion of the person in control of the property. Obviously a court
of equity cannot direct what disposition one shall
make O·f property which is given to him to dispose
of as he chooses. Unbridled discretion in a trustee
not only negatives the necessary separation of
legal and equitable ownerships, but is also objectionable, so far as the existence of a trust is
concerned, by reason of the uncertainty it involves ... See also Restatement, Trusts, Sfctio11
125.
" 'While a trust is valid where it is imperative
as to the amount to be used for the beneficiary,
where the amounts, if any, which the beneficiaries
are to receive are wholly discretionar:v with tlw
alleged trustee, the trust is too uncertain to h<"
t>nforceable.' 65 C ..J. 273, Section 53."
In N onnan v. Prince, 101 A. 12G ( H.l.) tlw residu<:>
of the estate was left in trust "to pay the remaining or
ninth share of income, in '"hole or in part, at sueh time
or times as the trustee shall seleet to testator's said son
Hugh or to Hugh's wjfe or to any ehild or ehildren of
Hugh, or to any other pt>rson or persons whosOPY<>r a;-;
tlw trustee for the time being in its uncontrollc->d ah;-;olute disrrPtio.n or pleasurP of said trnsteP shall S<'r> fit:•
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It was held that the ninth share did not create a
trust because the Will imposed no enforceable obligation upon the trustees. Held:

"Said provision imposes no trust or obligation
with respect to the disposition of said ninth share
of income ...
"From the very broad language of the provision
as to the disposition of the said ninth share of
net income the testator's intent can readily be
found not to bequeath said share in trust for
indefinite beneficiaries; bitt the provision should
be regarded rather as a beqitest of said share to
the trustees with an arbitra.ry power of disposition. The use of the words 'trustee' and 'trustees'
in this clause of the will is not controlling as to
his or their character in the disposition of said
ninth share, but said words must be regarded as
descriptive .... "
Under the foregoing authorities, this \Vill, therefore,
rreated an outright gift of the residue in appellant, or
at least the \Vill creates an estate for five years with
power to consume principal and intPrest in appellant.
The second clause of paragraph 8 of the Will reads :
"said fund and the income therefrom to be held
and 1.csed lF!J my said nephew until his death or for
a period of five yPars afkr the date of my death
... upon the occurrence of such event my said
nephew ... shall distribute any part of the Trust
fund that may lJP then on hand to my heirs at law."
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The use of the words ''fund and income" means
principal and income.
"Any part that may then be on hand" indicates
testator's intention that some part or all of the fund
would have been used by his nephew during this period.
"By my said nephew" indicates a use of the propPrty for the benefit of the nephew and not for oth0rs.
rrhis second clausP obviously creates a use for five
years ~with power to invade and use the entire principal
vested in appellant. To construe the \Vill as an absolut<~
trust is to ignore this second clause. Instead, the second
clause modifies and expands the trust provisions in the
first clause to reflect a trust for five years with interim
power in the trustee to use the principal and interest
himself for five years and thereafter to pay over the
halance, if any, to tlw named beneficiaries. This is
identical, except for tl>rm, to the often recognized trnst
duties in a life estate with pO"wer to nse principal arnl
int<>n'st in the trustPe for his lifr.
rro the extent it is argued the two elanses are 11"reconcilable and the first controls, tlwn 7-1--2-~. F.C.A.
1958 applies:
''All the parts of a will are to he constrn('d rn
rPlation to Pach otlwr, and, if possihh>, so as t(I
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form one consistent whole; but where several
parts are absolutely irreconcilable, the later must
prevail."
The rules for interpreting this clause are set forth
in 33 Arn.J ur. p. 724 as foHows:
"The question whether the beneficiary of a life
estate has an implied power to use the principal
or corpus has most frequently arisen where the
testator has used some form of expression indicating an expectation that the subject of the gift
may undergo diminution during the continuance
of the particular estate. Accordingly, a right on
the part of the first taker to intrench upon tlw
principal or corpus has been inferred where the
t,rift over is described as being of all, what, or
so much as remains, or some very substantially
similar expression, what is unused, not consumed,
unexpended, or undisposed of, what is left, or
substantially similar expressions, the residue, the
balance, or very like terminology, the surplus, and
all the property that may revert. Likewise, an
inference of an intention that the first taker
should have the right to use the corpus has been
drawn from expressions making the gift over
contingent upon the existence of property, as
indicated by such expressions as if or should
anything remain, be left, or remain unexpended."

In In re Smythe's Estate, (Cal. 1955) 282 P.2d 141.
Tlw \Vill ]pft the remaindPr of the estate:
" ... to Ruth Smvthe for lwr during her lifetinw,
as she may need. or SP<> fit to USP. If, upon her
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death, any of my estate rernains, it is my will
that such remainder ... (go to ap1wllants) ."
The Court held this to be a life estate with power to use
and consume part or all of tlw principal, saying,
" ... If she consumes it all 'as she may need or
see fit to use' appellants get nothinp:. If she does
not, they get what is left."

ln In re Nichols' Estate, (19():2) 19 Cal. Hptr. 9:L
tlw will provided:
"You (sister Bess and appellant) can serve as
my executor without bond and after you get
through with it if there is any l<:>ft see that it
goes to our Bro. and Sisters."

'The trial court held the will disinherited app<:>llant, tlw
testator's only natural sisfrr, since there was no expn·s:~
gift to her and "011r . .. s1sters" excluded her. rl\•stimony
was admitted that testator had said "Bess is all I haw
and I'll alwavs take care of lwr. '' rl'he Court of Appeal
n-'versed, holding the gift to 1-Je a life estate to Sister
B<>ss with powPr to invade coqms to tlit' full Pxtent of
her own nc~Pds and pleasure, ·with lTlllaiml<·r to ''Brn.
and sisters." Jn overruling tlw confrntion that a gift to
an executor is in his n•presentativ<> <·apacit:'>' abs<·nt clPar
<•xpression to tlw contrar:>', the Court a1lprnv<·cl Fst:1f1' of
l\11rl-.-eet. Cal. :rn:i P.~d :-\~Hi, \\'hieli said:
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"
the mere use of the [technical] term may
well be deemed to crt>ate an uncertainty or ambiguity. . . .
.
"In reading this testimony we have in mind that
we are searching to find not only who the natural
objects of his bounty were, but in what order of
priority he naturally would have regarded them .
. . . There was no testimony that the testator ever
expressed any intent whatever to make any
(contestants) ... beneficiaries of his estate. Nor
is there any testimony that any of these persons
have any need for, nor any expectation of receiving, any of his estate .... Others declined to join
in the proceedings. The contestants, on the other
hand, were those with the most casual contacts,
or without any; pt>rsons with the least claims to
his bounty."
So, in this cas(', the grant to appellant to hold and use
1Jrincipal and income, and to distribute any part that
may be on hand constitutt>s, not a life estate, but an
(':-;tate for 5 year:-;.
Aprwllant's verified Petition for Discharge, paragraph 7, (R. 229) alh•ges that ·within five yt>an; of the
date of the dt>cedent's death, he disposed of the entire
principal and income in compliance with the \Vill of the
<l<'ct>dent. Henct>, there is nothing to account for and lw
:-;honld lw disrharged as tf•stanH'ntary truster.
POINT V
THE WILL IS AMBIGUOUS AND THE COURT
ERRED IN EXCLUDING PAROLE EVIDENCE IN
INTERPRETING TT.
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Assuming that the Order of Partial Distribution of
February 2±, 1959 does incorporate thti provisions of
paragraph 8 of the \Vill, the result is to create many
ambiguities concerning the intent of the testator as to
what he meant by paragraph 8. Und('r these <'ireumstances it was error for the District Court to sustain
respondents' objection to the introduction of extrinsic
<'videnc0 offered for the purpose of interpreting paragraph 8 and resolving the ambiguities and eonfliets f\O
that the intent of the testator would be ascertained,
<foclan•<l and enfor<'ed.
It is axiomatic that when a prov1s10n m a will is
ambiguous on its face, extrinsic evidence is admissible
to explain or resolve the ambiguity. This ty1w of
<•vidPnce includes all of the faets and circumstanc<•s
under whi<·h the \Vill was madt', including the relationshi}) and disposition of thP decedent to the he1wfieiaries
and the decedent's instructions to the scrivener, exclusive
of his oral de<'larations of his intPntion. 7-1-2-2 F.C.A.
J 95:3. The basic question in every instanrP is to deterrninP the intPnt of thP testator.
The ambiguities and inconsistencies in tlw Will in
tl1e int<•rprPtation of which the Court rould have lwPn
assisted by extrinsic evidPnc<> are detailPd in tit<> Point

TY. Perhaps the biggest arnhiguity is that which arises
wh<>n tlw word ''trust" is used and then the \Vill pro<'t•eds. step liy stPp. to takP away evPI'Y ek•rnc•nt of a
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trust in law by manifesting an intent not to impose
enforceable duties on the appellant. If the Court had
the assistance of extrinsic evidence, it might have coneluded that the testator did not intend to create a trust
in the first instance and that the Probate Court in its
Decree
of Distribution dated Februarv
.
. 24 ' 1959 did not
intend to create a trust, even assuming that paragraph
8 of the Will was incorporated by reference in the Decree.
The extrinsic evidence offered by the appellants
and rejected by the trial court is set forth in considerable
detail in the Offer of Proof, Exhibit 1 in the record, and
falls within the classification of the kind of extrinsic
evjdence which the Court finds useful in interpreting
·wills in order to ascertain the true intent of the testator.
l t particularly shO'ws that appellant was the natural
object of the decedent's bounty, that respondents were
not, and that the decedent did not intend to create a
tnrnt with enforct>ahle duties applicahl<• to appellant.
lt is urged by the appellant that if the Court had
l'Pceived tht> offered extrinsic evidt>nce, the Court might
liavf~ concluded that although the word 'trust' appears
i11 paragraph S, the real intt~nt of the testator was to
make an outright gift to the appellant.

Estate of Bandall, 49 Cal. Rptr. 280, Feb. 8, 19G6,
l10Ms that ewn though the word used in the \Vill is
fr<'<' from amhiguit~' in the dictionar.Y sPn:-:e

it rnay hP
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ambiguous in the sense it was intended to be used by
the testator. In that case, the will bequeathed "personal
effects" to testator's grandniece and the residue to charity. The grandniece contended that "personal effects"
included a deposit in the sum of $5,5G9.08 in tlw
patient's fund account in the \"'" eterans Hospital. Th<'
trial court held that "personal f•ffects" vrns free from
ambiguity and rejectt•d an off er to prove by Pxtrinsic
(•vidence that the decedent intendL•d personal effects to
inrlude the cash deposit. On appeal the court held tlw
words "personal effocts," in and of tlwmselves W<'re not
ambiguous, hut that in thP contPxt and in the circumstances surrounding the testator, if estahlisl1e<l lJy
extrinsic evidence, it could have lwen held that tlw
testator in this instancP intendPd personal dfrcts to
include the cash deposit and held that the ruling excluding the off PrPd extrinsir Pvidenr<' ~was <>nor. H <'ld:
"\Ve agree tlwn, with the trial court; tlwrP ~was
no ambiguity in the words rnwd tliat jnstifi( d
the receipt of f•xtrinsie evidence. Tlwn' are, however, other situations than the uncertainty of
ambiguity that call for a sPcond look at the rPal
meaning of 'personal effects' or similar ten11s ....
The function of words is to ronvey thonght.
vv"lly, then, if our oh.ieetive is to ase<'rtain tlll'
testatrix' intention, should WP not lParn what slw
meant by what she said~ It may he that shP us<><l
words in a sense that they do not ordinarily
convey.
1
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"We have concluded that in order to give the
will a construction according to the intent of the
testatrix, the trial court should have admitted
the profrered evidence in order that he might
know if, as claimed, she had come to use the
words 'personal effects' as embracing the sum
she had on deposit in the hospital where she had
thP othPr personal effects."
The logic of Estate of Randall compels tlw conclusion that the Trial Court erred in excluding the evidence
contained in the Offer of Proof submitted on behalf of
the appellant, for such could have explained the real
iHtention of the decedent in using the word "Trust"
in the 'Nill.
The mere use of the word ''trust" or "trustee" is
not conclusive that the testato.r intended a trust as a
mattt>r of la\\'. Indeed, tlw rnen• use of the word may,
of its('lf', create the ambiguity. In the follffwing cases,
among others, the ·will said "Trust" or "Trustee," but
tl1P courts held no trust ·was intended: Collins v. Mosher,
·''IJJrn; A.rtell L Coons, supra; Pom:elino v. Pmzzelino,
"'il]!m': Norman v. Pri11ce, s11pra.
l f tlw Trial Court in the ease at bar had considNed
t 111• Pxtrinsie <•videnee off Pred and l'('jected, and tlw
~-;tipulation for distribution which contains no provision
!'or a trnst (R -J.9), and the D('eree of Final Distribution
<lat Pd J\1 ay 10, 19()(), (R. ~17) ·whieh omit to makP any
provision for a irn:~t or nny rrf'Pr<'lW<' to paragraph ~
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of the Will, the Court might \Yell have concludede that
in the Order of Partial Distribution of February 2.+,
1959, the Court by its reference to paragraph 8 of the
Will, did not intend to create a trust because the testator
did not intend to create a trust and the reference in the
Order of Partial Distribution to paragraph R of the \\Till
should be treated as descriptive only.
POINT VI
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO REQUIRE APPELLANT TO ACCOUNT.

In the absence of fraud or dishonesty, the prnvisions
of the Order of Partial Distribution dated February 2.+,
1959, waiving an accounting by the trustee hy incorporating the provisions of paragraph S of the \Vill are
valid and enforceable.
The provision of said vVill incorporated m said
Dcirrep of Distribution rPads as follm,·s:
" ... Without the nece:ssity of making any accounting of any nature whatsoever to any p<'rson
or party concerning- the administration of thi:s
trust."
lt is clear that in the absence of provrn10ns in the
trust indenture waiving an accounting, a trustee is required to acrount. ThiR rult> is rodifo d in 7fi-1'.2-1~l"
l". C.A. 1~!1~.
1

1
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However, there is nothing in the .Code section which
provides that the creator of the trust may not include
in the trust provisions waiving the~ requirement of an
aecounting hy the trusteP.
The rule stated in the first paragraph is supported
liy Rl:'str:tement of Trusts, 8rtond, ~ 172:
"Even though a trust is created, the necessity of formal accounting by the trustee may be
dispensed with, unless this is prohibited by
statute. Thus, it may be provided that the trustee
shall not be under any duty to account to the
court. Such a provision is effective, unless, as in
the case of testamentary trusts in some states,
there is a statutory requirement for accounting
·which cannot be dispensed with.
* * * * *
"If a trust is created, it is required by public
policy that the trustee be answerable to the courts,
so far at least as tlw honest;.c of his conduct is
C'OTIC('rned."
\VhPther or not it could have been argued that the
inclusion in the OrdPr of Partial Distribution of tlH'
]>rnvision for waivPr of an aerounting by the trush•e
wm; enom'ous, it is establislie>d by the authorities, some
of ·w!ti(·lt an• di:-scus:-wd in Point 1 of this brief, that tlw
<nil:\" n•111ed:I' \\ cl.:S hy appeal from the Order of Partial
Distrilrri.tion and in tlH' absence of appeal, tlw Deen-'('
l1n;' 1wemlH' final <~11d conC'lm:ivP evPn to the extent that
i I is i•r;·on<•:n:s <.nd it is n·~: <Hl_i"lc(1ienta arnl hirnling l1pon
1
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all persons. Indeed, tlw Executor ha:-; even lwen finalh
discharged. (R. 222).
In their Answer and Cross Petition, respondPnts
do not allege fraud or dishmwsty on the part of th1·
trustee, nor did respondents offor any evidence ~wJii<'li
might tend to sho\\- any sn<>h fraud or dishonPst)-.
Therefore, whether the provision in paragraph ~
of the Will incorporated into the D<>cn·e of Distrilmtion
waiving accounting by the hustl'e is valid or inva1id,
there is no basis in the }H"l'S<'nt }H'O('e<'<lings affrr tlH·
Decree o.f Distribution has became fina1, for th<' Conrt
to make its Order requiring appellant n<w: to U<'('OLlll l
as a condition to di:. whar~:<'.
As Sf't forth s117Jrn, it is tlw primary funetion ot
thP ProbatP Court to dden11i1w and Pnfo1·e<' tlw t nH'
intPntions of tl10 t<'stator.

it
lwcomes apparent that tlw testator ma(l<~ Jffff\-ision for
the distribution of the trust fund to his rPlative::, n•,'.!;mdlPss of degree of kindrPd to llll'et ''eme1 g<·rn<<·s" a1 d
"for the use and henefit of thP \Yallich fnmil)'.'' Sinc-1•
it might prove embarrassing to the n·ci1Ji<·nts of t!w
funds to l avP tlwi r e1nergPnei<·s diselos<·<l in tlH' public
r<'eord, the testator also insPrtPd the prnvisions w<1iv;w;
an accounting. This d<·li<'at<· nrnl thong·hf'nl nd d t'.H
ti•stator sl10nld not lightly lH' di:-:r1·c.?;nnl1·1~.
From a reading of paragraph S of th<'

~Will,

1

1

55
It is, therefore, submitted upon all of the grounds
herein set forth that the Order and Decree appealed from
must be reversed.
POINT VII
APPELLANT IS NOT ESTOPPED TO ASSERT
HE IS NOT A TRUSTEE.

Neither of the receipts signed by appellant (R. 199201) are relevant because they were executed after the
entry of the Order of Partial Distribution and they cannot jmpeach or modify that final judgment.
There is no evidence that respondents even knew of
the receipts, or that they changed their position or relied
thereon to their detriment.
In Niccolls v. Niccolls, Cal. 143 P.712, an intervivos
conveyance in trust to be effective on death of the
grantor, was not executed with the formality of a will;
hPld, the trustee was not estopped to assert the trust
was void.
vVhether or not a trust exists depends upon the
intent of the testatm. The subsequent acts of appellant
cannot supply the requisite intent of the testator.
Estoppel precludes one from denying or asserting
a material fact ' which bv
. his words or conduct he intentionallv or through rulpahle negligence induces another,
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who was exciisably ignorant of the true facts to l;Plicrc
and act upon them, thereby, as a reasonably anticipated
consequence, changing 711°.<> position in such a ,,-a~1 that hP
suffers injury if such contrary assertion or denial w<:>1·r·
allowed. Migliaccio v. Davis, (1951) l 20 Vt. 1, 232 P.2d
195. Here, there is no showing of inducement, no relianru
hy cross-petitioners, no change of position and no injni·~-.

CON CL UST ON
The Order of Partial Distribution of February 21-,
1959, herein is not ambiguous, does not incorporate thr
will by reference and on its face distributed the l'PSi(hH'
of the testator's estat(~ to appellant outright. The District Court erred in holding to the contrary by its Ord('l°
of .January 28, 19GG, and tlu~ OrdN should 1le n-'Y('I'S<'rl
and the case remanded to the District Court with instnir-

In the alternativP, if the Order of Partial Distrilrntion did incorporate the 'Yill into its frrrns, then orn' 01·
the terms so ineorporatPd is the provision ·waiving an ae<'Ounting hy appellant.

Therl'fme the Disfr:d Court

t>ITed in its Order of .January 2S, 19()() r<'qniring app<'llant to account and such should be reversed and tlw
('.ase remanded to the District Court with instruction:;
without an aceonnting.
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In the alternative, if the Order of Partial Distribution did incorporate the will into its terms, then the
Will l<~ft the residue of decedent's estate to appellant
<·itht>r outright, or for five years with povvPr to invade
]Jrincipal. If the latter, since principal and income has
been disposed of during the five-year period, there is no
n<'ed for an accounting. In either event, the District
Court':-; Order of .January 28, 196G, requiring appellant
to account is in error and tht> case should be reversed
and the case remanded with instructions to the District
Court to discharge appellant as a tnrntee without an
a<·counting.
In the alternative, the will of the decedent is amhiguous and the District Court erred in sustaining
objections to offered extrinsic evidence to aid in resolving the ambiguity. Therefore, the District Court's Order
of ,January 28, 19G6 should be reversed and the case
remanded to the District Court with instructions to
receive extrinsic evidence to resolve the ambiguity in the
-Will as to whether an outright gift, an estate for five
yt>ars or a gift in trust of the residue of the estate was
intPnded hy the decedent.
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J olm L. Mace, Esq.
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